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Abstract	
We analyzed the role played by Theory of Mind in children’s ability to recognize and repair 
different kinds of communicative failures. In particular we analyzed three different kinds of 
communicative failures: failure of the expression act, communicative meaning and communicative 
effect. We administered videotaped stories where people act out a communicative failure and ToM 
tasks, to 120 children ranging in age from 3;6 to 8;6 years. The children showed a trend of 
increasing difficulty in managing the communicative failures investigated. Moreover, children's 
ToM ability is partially correlated with recognition and repair of a communicative task, however it 
is not able to explain the trend of difficulty we detected. We suggest that the factor better explaining 
such trend is the increasing complexity of the mental representations underlying the three different 
kinds of failures.  
 
 
Keywords: communicative failures, recognition, repair, theory of mind, development 
cognitive pragmatics 
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Introduction 
	 The	purpose	of	this	research	was	to	investigate	the	role	of	Theory	of	Mind	(ToM)	in	recognizing	and	
repairing	a	communicative	failure,	an	important	phenomenon	in	the	pragmatic	domain	albeit	somewhat	
ignored	by	the	recent	literature.		
Pragmatics	refers	to	the	use	of	language	to	perform	social	functions,	i.e.	to	communicate	with	other	
people	(see	for	example	Habermas,	2000).	A	communicative	failure	occurs	when	a	person	does	not	succeed	
in	modifying	another	person’s	mental	state	in	the	desired	way.	Recognition	of	a	communicative	failure	
occurs	when	a	speaker	realizes	such	a	failure	has	occurred	and	the	repair	of	a	communicative	failure	is	
another	attempt	by	the	speaker	(following	the	failed	attempt)	to	convince	the	partner	to	adhere	to	his	
communicative	purpose.	The	recognition	and	the	recovery	of	communicative	failures	require	pragmatic	
communicative	competence	since	they	imply	the	use	of	language	for	social	purposes.	
ToM	is	the	ability	to	attribute	mental	states	to	other	people	and	to	oneself,	and	to	use	such	
knowledge	to	interpret	and	predict	other	people’s	and	one’s	own	behavior	(Premack	&	Woodruff,	1978).		
In	order	to	test	ToM	ability	we	used	first-order	(Baron-Cohen,	Leslie	&	Frith,	1985;	Perner,	Leekam	&	
Wimmer,	1987)	and	second-order	classical	false	belief	tasks	(Sullivan	et	al.	1995),	in	addition	to	the	Picture	
Sequencing	task	(Langdon	&	Coltheart,	1999),	a	non-verbal	test	investigating	the	comprehension	of	false	
belief	and	social	interaction.	False	belief	tasks	is	a	specific	case	of	use	of	ToM	and	consists	in	the	ability	to	
attribute	mental	states	to	other	people	and	to	use	such	knowledge	to	interpret	and	predict	other	people’s	
behavior,	when	one's	own	knowledge	of	the	world	differs	from	another	person’s	one.	False	belief	paradigm	
has	been	classically	used	to	investigate	ToM	in	the	developmental	domain	(Perner	&	Wimmer,	1983;	
Wimmer	&	Perner,	1985;	Sullivan	et	al.	1995;	see	Wellman	&	Liu.	2002).	Some	authors	highlighted	the	role	
of	communicative	failure,	as	the	case	of	misunderstanding,	during	a	communicative	interaction,	
considering	it	not	so	much	a	breakdown	but	an	integral	part	of	the	comprehension	process	(see	
Dascal,1985;	Blum-Kulka	and	Weizman,	1988;	Weigand	1999;	Bazzanella	&	Damiano	1999;	Bosco	et	al.	
2015).		
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	 Weigand	(1999)	for	example	contends	that	in	instances	of	non-understanding	during	a	
communicative	interaction,	the	hearer	signals	the	problem	and	starts	the	clarification	process,	whereas	in	
cases	of	misunderstanding	the	process	of	clarification	is	usually	initiated	by	the	speaker.	Bazzanella	and	
Damiano	(1999)	proposed	five	levels	at	which	misunderstanding	can	arise	in	everyday	conversation:	
phonetic,	syntactic,	lexical,	semantic,	and	pragmatic,	all	of	which	involve	a	discrepancy	between	the	
speaker’s	intent	and	the	hearer’s	interpretation.	The	level	of	discrepancy	may	vary,	depending	on	the	
extent	to	which	the	hearer	accepts	or	refuses	the	speaker’s	meaning,	and	it	is	this	that	determines	the	
degree	to	which	an	utterance	is	understood.	
	 In	the	developmental	domain	the	main	empirical	studies	concerned	with	children's	ability	to	
manage	communicative	failures	were	conducted	in	the	1970s	(Robinson	&	Robinsion,	1977;	Perterson	et	al.	
1972),	1980s	(Beal,	1982)	and	1990s	(Marcos,	1991;	Marcos & Kornhaber-le Chanu, 1992).	An analysis of 
some of these studies revealed that children are able to adopt different kinds of repair strategies depending 
on what kind of failure occurs, and that as they grow up, they use different forms of repair. For example, one 
of the first repair strategies used by toddlers in case of communicative failure is repetition (Golinkoff, 1986) 
a strategy that children tend to use less as they grow up (Garvey, 1984). Furthermore, Anselmi et al. (1986) 
pointed out that when a communicative failure occurs during an interaction, children aged between 1;8 and 
3;8 years tend to repeat the whole sentence when their mother responds with a neutral query (‘What?’), 
whereas when their mother asks a specific question (‘Where’s the dog?’), they accordingly provide a more 
specific answer. Along the same lines, Wilcox & Webster (1980) pointed out that between one-and-half and 
two years of age, children are able to use two different repair strategies: repetition and modification. In 
particular, they are able to modify their requests simply by repeating the same question, when the adult 
answers with a neutral query (‘What?’), whereas they reformulate their request when the adult answers with 
a simple declarative comment (‘Yes, I see it’). Marcos (1991) too showed that children of this age are able to 
reformulate a request, as a function of their mothers’ response. Moreover, by the time they are 18 months 
old, children seem to adopt the correct repair strategy according to the kind of failure that occurred: when the 
mother misunderstands, instead of refusing to accomplish the request, they use increased vocalization in 
order to clarify their request rather than simply insisting by repeating it, an ability that is not present in 
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children aged 14 months (Marcos & Kornhaber-le Chanu, 1992). More recently, on the basis of an original 
study by Shwe & Markman (1997), Grosse, Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello (2010) showed that starting from 
the age of one-and- a-half children repair their request differently according to the failure that has occurred, 
for example misunderstanding the referent vs. the communicative intention.	
 In	order	to	allow	for	the	existence	of	different	kinds	of	communicative	failures,	Bosco,	Bucciarelli	& 
Bara	(2006)	proposed	and	empirically	investigated	an	original	taxonomy	of	different	kinds	of	failures	which	
may	occur	in	a	communicative	interaction,	in	children	ranging	in	age	from	3	to	8	years.	In	particular	the	
authors	reported	a	trend	of	increasing	difficulty	in	children's	ability	to	recognize	and	repair:	i)	failure	of	the	
expression	act1,	that	is	failure	of	the	literal	meaning,	such	as	for	example	to understand ‘sheep’ instead of 
‘ship’, ii) failure	of	the	speaker’s	meaning2,	that	is	failure	of	the	speakers'	intended	meaning,	such	as	for	
example,	Polyphemus	crying	out:	‘Nobody	is	trying	to	kill	me’	referring	to	Ulysses	who	was	trying	to	kill	him	
saying	his	name	was	"Nobody",	and	iii)	failure	of	the	communicative	effect,	that	is	the	unsuccessful	attempt	
to	convince	someone	to	do	something.	The	authors	explained	their	results	in	light	of	the	Cognitive	
Pragmatics	theory	(Airenti,	Bara	&	Colombetti,	1993a,	1993b;	see	Bara,	2010;	2011	for	the	most	recent	
developments),	a	theory	on	human	communication	(see	next	section).	
	 Several	authors	have	highlighted	the	role	of	ToM	in	human	pragmatic	communication:	a	capacity	to	
attribute	mental	states	and	to	behave	accordingly	needs	to	have	been	developed	in	order	to	comprehend	a	
partner’s	communicative	intention	(Bosco,	Colle	&	Tirassa,	2009;	Happé	&	Loth,	2002;	Sperber	&	Wilson,	
2002;	Tirassa	et	al.,	2006a,	2006b;	Tirassa	&	Bosco,	2008;).	The	first	authors	to	point	to	a	link	between	
Theory	of	Mind	(ToM)	and	the	ability	to	repair	communicative	failure	were,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	
Feldman	and	Kalmar	(1996).	They	reported	that	a	person	in	a	conversation	tends	to	repair	a	
communication	breakdown	by	adjusting	his	or	her	strategy	to	take	the	partner’s	mental	states	into	account	
																																								 																				
1 For theoretical reasons Bosco, Bucciarelli & Bara (2006) used the term "expression act" instead of "literal 
meaning". For the sake of consistency we have used the same label "expression act" instead of "literal 
meaning" throughout the paper. 
2 In line with the Cognitive Pragmatics Theory (Bara, 2010), we have used the term ‘partner’ instead of the 
more conventional ‘listener’. By contrast, in the present investigation, for the sake of clarity, we have used 
the conventional term ‘speaker’ instead of ’Actor’, which is the term used in the Cognitive Pragmatics 
theory. 
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and	trying	to	figure	out	why	the	communicative	intention	was	not	recognized,	or	a	request	was	not	
accepted.		
	 In	keeping	with	this	assumption,	in	the	field	of	clinical	pragmatics	(Cummings,	2009;	2014),	it	has	
been	observed	that	communicative	failures	(see	Keen,	2003)	and	communicative	errors	(Loukusa	et	al.,	
2007)	occur	more	frequently	in	children	with	autism,	Asperger	syndrome	or	high-functioning	autism,	all	of	
which	have	been	found	to	be	associated	with	a	deficit	in	ToM	(Baron-Cohen,	et	al.,	1985),	than	among	their	
typically	developing	peers.	Volden	(2004)	observed	that	children	with	autism	spectrum	disorder	(ASD)	were	
similar	to	control	group	children	in	their	ability	to	use	increasingly	flexible	and	complex	repair	strategies	in	
response	to	neutral	requests,	requests	for	clarification,	or	semi-structured	prompts	(‘Tell	me	another	way’).	
However,	the	author	also	reported	that	children	with	ASD	were	more	likely	to	give	an	inappropriate	
response	than	those	in	the	control	group.	Taken	as	a	whole,	these	findings	suggest	that	a	deficit	in	ToM	
affects	children’s	ability	to	repair	communicative	failures.		
We	proposed	that	ToM	plays	a	role	in	children’s	ability	both	to	repair	and	recognize	communicative	
failures.	In	recognizing	a	failure	a	person	must	realize	that	he	or	she	has	failed	to	modify	the	partner’s	
mental	state,	in	terms	of	knowledge,	desire,	belief	and	so	on,	in	the	desired	way.	In	repairing	a	
communicative	failure	a	person	makes	another	attempt	to	change	the	partner’s	mental	state	in	the	desired	
way,	bearing	in	mind	the	strategy	that	failed.	We	thus	predicted	that:	
Hypothesis	1.	Children’s	performance	on	ToM	tasks	is	correlated	with	their	accuracy	in	both	
recognizing	and	repairing	a	communicative	failure.	
Moreover,	in	line	with	the	relevant	literature	(Wellman	&	Liu	2002;	Bosco	et	al.	2006)	we	expected	
that:		
Hypothesis	2.	Children’s	ability	to	solve	ToM	tasks	and	recognize	and	repair	communicative	failures	
will	increase	with	the	age.	
Furthermore,	in	the	present	paper	we	wish	to	replicate	the	finding	that	children	exhibit	a	trend	of	
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increasing	difficulty	in	recognizing	and	repairing	a	communicative	failure	reported	by	Bosco	et	al.	(2006).	In	
particular	we	investigated	whether	the	trend	of	increasing	difficulty	in	recognizing	and	repairing	different	
kinds	of	communicative	failures,	i.e.	failure	of	expressive	act,	failure	of	communicative	meaning,	failure	of	
communicative	effect,	could	be	explained	by	children’s	performance	on	ToM	tasks,	in	addition	to	their	age.		
Finally,	for	exploratory	purposes,	we	also	examined	the	role	of	the	family’s	socio-economic	status	
(SES)	on	children’s	pragmatic	development,	in	order	to	verify	whether	this	variable	could	affect	the	ability	
to	recognize	and	repair	communicative	failures.	
	
The	Cognitive	Pragmatics	Theory		
The	Cognitive	Pragmatics	Theory	(Airenti	et	al.,	1993a;	1993b)	explains	the	cognitive	processes	
underlying	human	communication;	it	has	been	found	to	be	effective	for	explaining	the	increasing	accuracy	
with	which	children	and	young	adults	comprehend	and	produce	several	pragmatic	phenomena	such	as	
direct	and	indirect	communication	acts,	irony	and	deceit	(Angeleri	et	al.	2012;	Bosco	&	Bucciarelli,	2008;	
Bosco	et	al.,	2013)	and	figurative	language	(Bosco	et	al.,	2012).	We	will	now	summarize	the	main	
theoretical	assumptions	of	the	theory	(for	a	more	detailed	description	please	see	Bara,	2010;	2011).	
Grice	(1975)	identified	cooperation	as	the	fundamental	element	of	communicative	interaction.	
According	to	the	Pragmatics	theory,	for	cooperation	to	be	concrete	both	of	the	interlocutors	must	be	
familiar	with	the	plan	of	action	they	are	carrying	out.	Airenti,	Bara	and	Colombetti	(1993a)	called	the	
scheme	of	an	action	plan	known	to	both	A	and	B	a	behavioral	game.	A	behavioral	game	is	a	shared	
conventional	pattern	of	interaction	in	which	participants	in	a	dialogue	interpret	the	interlocutor’s	
communication.	The	speaker’s	communicative	intention	is	understood	on	the	basis	of	the	beliefs	that	
people	share	in	a	communicative	exchange,	that	is	on	the	basis	of	the	shared	behavioral	game.	The	notion	
of	behavioral	game	is	useful	to	understand	how	it	is	possible	to	attribute	different	communicative	
meanings	to	the	same	communicative	act	(verbal	or	non-verbal).		
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Let	us	consider	the	following	example	taken	from	Bara	(2010):	imagine	a	situation	in	which	two	
people	are	engaged	in	a	conversation	and	then	one	of	them	looks	at	his	watch.	If	the	person	who	looks	at	
his	watch	is	of	superior	status,	the	other	person	will	interpret	the	gesture	as	meaning	it	is	time	the	
conversation	ended.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	person	of	lower	status	looks	at	his	watch,	the	other	person	
will	interpret	the	gesture	as	a	request	for	permission	to	leave.	If	the	speakers	are	unable	to	identify	a	
shared	behavioral	game	in	which	they	consider	the	communication	act	as	a	move,	they	will	not	be	able	to	
understand	it.	Now	consider	another	example,	again	taken	from	Bara	(2010):	a	clerk	is	working	in	his	office	
when	a	complete	stranger	comes	in	and	says:	
[1]	 It's	snowing	outside.																																						
	 Although	the	clerk	would	have	no	difficulty	in	understanding	the	literal	meaning	of	the	utterance,	
he	would	be	very	puzzled.	He	would	only	be	able	to	make	the	necessary	inferences	and	thus	give	an	
appropriate	answer	if	he	were	to	interpret	[1]	as	an	invitation	to	stay	indoors,	a	request	to	close	the	
window,	a	reminder	to	take	his	umbrella,	etc.	The	pure	and	simple	literal	aspect	of	the	utterance,	without	a	
game	to	refer	it	to,	has	no	communicative	significance.	Although	the	literal	meaning	is	an	important	
starting	point,	this	on	its	own	is	not	enough	to	enable	us	to	answer	the	questions	we	ask	ourselves	when	
another	person	is	speaking	to	us:	"Why	is	she	saying	that	to	me?	What	does	she	want	me	to	do?"	
Consider	the	following	communicative	exchange:	
	[2]	Anita:	Oh,	I’m	really	late!	
							Ben:	Ok	I'll	drive	you	to	the	office.	
Here,	the	speaker’s	communicative	intention	must	be	understood	in	order	to	recognize	the	
behavioral	game	she	is	proposing.	In	[2]	Anita	and	Ben	must	share	the	knowledge	of	the	behavioral	game	
[GIVE-LIFT]	in	order	to	understand	the	communicative	meaning	of	the	utterance	proffered.		
• A	asks	B	to	give	her	a	lift;	
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• B	may	accept,	refuse,	propose	an	alternative	solution,	etc.	
According	to	the	Cognitive	Pragmatics	theory	(see	Bara,	2010;	2011),	the	actions	actually	performed	
by	a	person	determine	the	moves	of	the	behavioral	game	being	played.	The	meaning	of	a	communicative	
act	(which	may	be	linguistic	–	i.e.	a	speech	act	-	or	non-verbal	–	i.e.	a	communicative	gesture	-	or,	more	
often,	a	combination	of	the	two)	is	only	fully	understood	when	the	move	of	the	relative	behavioral	game	is	
clear.	A	speaker	may	use	various	moves	to	propose	a	behavioral	game	to	the	partner.	Consider	the	[GIVE-
LIFT]	game	once	again.	
Ann	might	ask	her	brother	Brian	to	lend	her	his	car	by	saying	(possible	moves):	
[3]	Please	give	me	a	lift.	
[4]	Would	you	give	me	a	lift?	
[5]	My	car	is	at	the	body	shop;	I	can’t	go	to	work	tomorrow.	
[6]	I’m	sad	because	I	haven’t	got	a	car	for	Saturday...	
In	line	with	the	theory,	the	same	move	could	have	several	literal	formulations.	Consider	the	
formulation	below	[4]:	
[4a]	Would	you	mind	giving	me	a	lift?	
[4b]	Please	give	me	a	lift.	
[4c]	Would	you	very	kindly	give	me	a	lift?	
The	same	move	might	even	be	part	of	more	than	one	behavioral	game	at	the	same	time.	For	
instance,	[6]	fits	both	the	[LEND-CAR]	game	and	the	[GIVE	A	LIFT]	game.	
Behavioral	games	are	structures	that	coordinate	interpersonal	actions,	and	are	used	during	
communication	to	choose	the	actual	meaning	of	an	utterance	from	the	various	possibilities	that	are	
available.	Behavioral	games	exhibit	different	degrees	of	applicability:	some	are	universal,	others	are	specific	
COMMUNICATIVE FAILURES AND THEORY OF MIND 
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to	certain	cultures	or	social	groups,	and	some	are	only	known	by	two	people.		
The	Cognitive	Pragmatics	theory	also	describes	a	sequence	of	processes	that	are	necessary	in	order	
to	understand	and	produce	a	(standard)3	communication	act:	
Expression	act:	the	partner	recognizes	the	literal	meaning	of	the	speaker’s	utterance.	
Speaker’s	meaning:	the	partner	understands	and	reconstructs	the	meaning	intended	by	the	speaker.	
Communicative	effect:	the	partner	acquires	or	modifies	his/her	mental	states	in	line	with,	and	as	a	
consequence	of	the	communicative	intentions	expressed	by	the	speaker.	
Reaction	and	Response:	the	partner	produces	a	response.	
	
Recognition of failure of a communication act: A taxonomy 
Bosco	et	al.	(2006)	proposed,	and	empirically	investigated,	a	taxonomy	of	the	different	sorts	of	
failures	that	may	occur	during	the	comprehension/generation	processes	described	above.	The	taxonomy	
takes	into	account	the	speaker's	perspective	and	the	complexity	of	the	mental	representations	involved	in	
their	recognition.	The	label	"complexity	of	mental	representations"	refers	to	the	presence	of	discrepancies	
and	inconsistencies	between	the	expression	act,	the	speaker's	meaning	and	the	communicative	effect	(see	
Table	1).	In	line	with	Bazzanella	&	Damiano	(1999)	we	hypotesize	that	such	discrepancy	can	varies	in	degree	
considering	the	different	kind	of	failure	analyzed	and	in	line	with	Bosco	et	al.	(2006),	we	assumed	that	
children	would	experience	more	difficulties	in	managing	failures	involving	mental	representations	of	
increasing	complexity.		
	 In	order	to	recognize	that	a	failure	has	occurred,	and	try	to	repair	it,	the	person	must	recognize	that	
there	is	a	discrepancy	between	what	the	speaker	wanted	to	obtain	in	proffering	the	communicative	act	(for	
example	to	induce	the	partner	to	do	to	something,	to	believe	something	or	simply	to	share	something)	and	
																																								 																				
3 According to the Cognitive Pragmatics theory standard communication acts are direct and indirect speech 
acts whereas irony and deceit are examples of non-standard communication acts. 
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the	effect	he	or	she	actually	obtained.	By	contrast,	in	successful	communication	the	partner	recognizes	the	
speaker’s	goal	and	there	is	no	discrepancy.	In	our	experimental	protocol	successful	communication	
represented	the	control	condition.	We	thus	predicted	that:	
Hypothesis	3:	recognizing	a	communicative	failure	is	more	difficult	than	recognizing	a	successful	(standard)	
communication	act.	
In	addition,	a	communicative	failure	may	also	involve	the	presence	of	inconsistencies.	According	to	
Bucciarelli	et	al.	(2003),	the	presence	of	inconsistencies	between	the	speaker’s	and	the	partner’s	mental	
representations	of	the	move/game	played	during	the	communicative	interaction	is	one	specific	factor	that	
may	hamper	the	comprehension	of	a	communication	act.		
	 Failure	of	the	expression	act	occurs	in	the	first	phase	of	the	comprehension	process,	when	the	
speaker	realizes	that	the	partner	has	failed	to	understand	the	expressive	value	of	the	utterance.	There	is	an	
inconsistency	between	the	move	proposed	by	the	speaker	and	the	move	attributed	to	her	or	him.	A	
breakdown	at	this	stage	brings	the	comprehension	process	to	a	halt,	since	the	expression	act	is	the	first	
step	that	allows	the	partner	to	understand	the	speaker’s	communicative	intention.	
	 Failure	of	the	speaker’s	meaning	occurs	in	the	second	phase	of	the	comprehension	process,	when	
the	speaker	realizes	that	the	partner	has	failed	to	understand	the	behavioral	game	at	play.	The	partner	
understands	the	expression	act	through	which	the	communication	act	is	performed,	but	fails	to	associate	
the	move	with	the	behavior	game	bid	by	the	speaker.	To	fully	understand	a	communication	act,	the	partner	
must	recognize	the	game	of	which	it	constitutes	a	move.	The	same	utterance	can	give	rise	to	different	
communicative	intentions	and	the	partner	can	only	understand	the	speaker’s	communicative	intention	if	
he	or	she	also	recognizes	the	behavioral	game	bid	by	the	speaker.	This	type	of	failure	is	caused	by	an	
inconsistency	between	the	game	to	which	the	partner’s	move	refers	and	the	game	suggested	by	the	
speaker’s	move.	Unlike	with	failure	of	the	expression	act,	this	difference	has	more	to	do	with	the	game	
implied	by	the	move	than	with	the	direct	move	made	by	the	speaker.	To	recognize	failure	of	the	speaker’s	
meaning,	the	partner	must	detect	this	inconsistency	in	the	representations	of	the	game	being	played.	
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Failure	of	the	speaker’s	meaning	is	therefore	more	difficult	to	detect	than	failure	of	the	expression	act.	
	 Failure	of	the	communicative	effect	occurs	in	the	last	stage	of	the	comprehension	process	and	does	
not	involve	the	detection	of	an	inconsistency.	The	partner	comprehends	the	expression	act	and	the	
speaker’s	meaning,	but	does	not	adhere	to	the	speaker’s	goal.	This	constitutes	an	explicit	and	overt	refusal	
by	the	partner	to	join	in	the	game	proposed	by	the	speaker.	Failure	of	the	communicative	effect	is	
therefore	the	simplest	type	of	failure	to	be	detected.	In	the	pragmatic	domain,	communicative	ability	is	
defined	as	an	agent’s	intentional	act	proffered	with	the	aim	to	modify	(a	part	of)	the	partner's	knowledge	
(Grice,	1957).	In	particular,	successful	communication	is	referred	to	as	the	partner’s	recognition	of	a	
speaker's	specific	intention,	which	includes	the	achievement	of	a	specific	(communicative)	effect	on	the	
partner	(Grice,	1989).	Recognizing	that	the	speaker	has	not	achieved	this	is	thus	part	of	an	individual’s	
pragmatic	ability.	
Hypothesis 4. In recognizing a communicative failure, children will exhibit the following trend 
of difficulty, from the simplest to the most complex: failure of the communicative effect, failure of 
the expression act and failure of the speaker’s meaning. 
 
- Table 1 about here - 
	
Repairing a communicative failure 
When	the	speaker	repairs	a	communicative	failure,	he	or	she	makes	another	attempt	to	convince	the	
partner	to	adhere	to	his	communicative	purpose	(which	previously	failed,	Bosco	et	al.,	2006).	The	speaker	
may	choose	from	a	variety	of	repair	strategies:	the	repair	strategy	adopted	by	the	speaker	depends	on	the	
kind	of	failure	that	has	occurred,	and	thus	takes	into	account	the	inconsistency	and	the	kind	of	discrepancy	
that	characterized	the	failure.	Simply	adopting	a	strategy	is	obviously	not	enough	to	guarantee	success:	it	is	
up	to	the	partner	to	accept	or	reject	the	speaker’s	proposal.	According	to	Bosco	et	al.	(2006),	there	is	a	
trend	of	difficulty	in	repairing	different	communicative	failures.			
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Repairing	failure	of	the	expression	act:	the	simplest	repair	strategy	consists	of	repeating	the	failed	
move	in	exactly	the	same	way.	Consider	the	following	example:		
[7]	Billy	is	sitting	on	the	beach	reading	the	newspaper.	His	girlfriend	Amy	arrives	and	says:		
Amy: ‘How about going for a walk along the promenade?’ 
A	motorboat	passes	close	to	the	shore,	making	a	lot	of	noise.	
Billy:	‘What	did	you	say?’	
In	this	case,	Amy	may	repeat	her	request,	‘How	about	going	for	a	walk	along	the	promenade?’.	This	
would	involve	repeating	the	same	move	and	proposing	the	same	behavioral	game.	This	is	the	simplest	
repair	strategy,	in	which	nothing	has	to	be	changed	with	respect	to	the	failed	communication	act.	For	this	
strategy	to	be	effective,	the	problem	(in	this	case	the	noise)	must	be	eliminated.	For	example,	in	[7]	Amy	
will	either	have	to	wait	for	the	noise	to	stop	or,	if	it	continues,	speak	louder.	
Repairing the failure of the speaker’s meaning: the simplest strategy consists of reformulating 
the failed move using a different utterance. As already mentioned, different linguistic formulations 
may be used to express the same move. Consider the following example, in which the speaker’s 
meaning is misunderstood: 
	[8]	Billy	meets	his	sister	Ann	in	the	street;	she	wants	to	ask	him	to	invite	her	for	dinner.	
Ann:	‘Billy,	I'm	really	hungry’.	
Billy:	‘You	can	go	to	a	very	nice	bistro	nearby’.	
In	this	case,	the	simplest	way	of	repairing	the	failure	is	to	rephrase	the	utterance	in	order	to	make	the	
communicative	intention	clearer.	This	is	a	more	complex	case	of	repair	with	respect	to	the	previous	one	
since	it	involves	at	least	changing	the	formulation	of	the	move	in	order	to	make	it	effective.	For	example,	
Ann	could	say:	‘Come	on,	Billy,	invite	me	to	dinner’.	
Repairing	the	failure	of	communicative	effect:	the	simplest	strategy	consists	of	choosing	an	
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alternative,	more	appropriate	move.	This	could	be	done	by	opting	for	a	more	acceptable	or	attractive	move	
for	instance,	or	even	proposing	an	alternative	game.	This	case	of	repair	is	more	complex	than	the	previous	
one	because	simply	reformulating	the	move	is	not	sufficient	in	order	to	repair	the	previous	failure	and	it	
involves	at	least	changing	the	move	proposed.	In	our	example	Ann	could	suggest	some	sort	of	a	deal	with	
Billy,	for	instance:	
	[9]	Ann:	‘If	you	invite	me	to	dinner	I'll	make	your	breakfast	tomorrow	morning!’	
To summarize: the expression act is the simplest case since it can be repaired by repeating the 
move, without reformulating the utterance; failure of the speaker’s meaning is more complex since 
it can be repaired by using an alternative communication act to perform the move; failure of the 
communicative effect is more complex to repair, as the speaker must take into account the partner’s 
private motivations. In this case, although the partner has understood the move bid by the speaker, 
he or she refuses to play the game. In line with Bosco et al. (2006) we predicted that: 
Hypothesis 5. Children will exhibit a trend of increasing difficulty in repairing a 
communicative failure, from the simplest to the most complex: expression act, speaker’s meaning 
and communicative effect. 
Hypothesis 6. Finally we wished to explore whether ToM offers an alternative explanation 
(with respect the one provided above) for the trend of increasing difficulty experienced by children 
in recognizing and repairing a communicative failure. 
 
Socio-Economic	Status	and	Pragmatic	Development	
Family	socio-economic	status	(SES)	is	a	predictor	of	many	aspects	of	child	development,	particularly	
language	development	(e.g.,	Hoff-Ginsberg,	1998;	Row,	2008).	SES	differences	seem	to	be	associated	with	
differences	within	the	normal	range	of	performance	across	a	number	of	cognitive	abilities,	and	to	be	
related	to	children’s	language	and	executive	control	abilities.	For	this	reason,	SES	should	be	taken	into	
account	when	investigating	the	development	of	such	cognitive	abilities	(Noble,	Norman	&	Farah,	2005).	In	a	
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recent	study	Bosco	and	coll.	(2013)	showed	that	SES	has	a	moderate	overall	effect	on	children’s	pragmatic	
performance	during	the	schooling	period.	
For	explorative	purposes,	we	thus	examined	the	relationship	between	SES	and	children’s	ability	to	
recognize	and	repair	a	communicative	failure	in	order	to	identify	some	possible	influences.	
Hypothesis	7.	We	explored	the	influence	of	SES	on	children’s	performance	on	recognition	and	repair	of	
communicative	failure	tasks.	
	
Method	
Participants	
	 	 	 The	sample	consisted	of	120	children.	Since	we	wished	to	replicate	evidence	related	to	the	
increasing	trend	of	difficulty	in	recognizing	and	repairing	different	kinds	of	communicative	failures	as	
previously	shown	by	Bosco	et	al.	(2006),	we	studied	the	performance	of	children	within	the	same	age	
groups:	3;6	to	4	years	(mean	age:	3;9);	5	to	5;6	years	(mean	age:	5;3);	6;6	to	7	years	(mean	age:	6;8);	and	8	
to	8;6	years	(mean	age:	8;3).	The	children	were	randomly	recruited	from	among	pupils	at	four	different	pre-
schools	and	schools	in	[removed	for	review].	The	30	participants	in	each	age	group	were	balanced	for	
gender.	No	bilingual	participants	were	included	in	the	study.		
	 	 	 The	children’s	socio-economic	status	(SES)	was	measured	using	a	questionnaire	filled	out	by	
their	parents	with	information	about	family	composition,	parental	educational	level	and	occupation.	We	
derived	the	SES	index	from	the	Two-Factor	Index	of	Social	Status	(Hollingshead,	1975).	Starting	from	the	
Hollingshead	procedure	and	according	to	the	current	Italian	social	context,	we	updated	the	employment	
categories.	We	calculated	the	SES	scores	of	the	children’s	families	by	multiplying	the	scale	values	of	both	
parents	for	occupation	(ranging	from	1	to	7)	and	for	education	(ranging	from	1	to	7)	by	factor	weights	of	7	
and	4,	respectively.	We	then	obtained	the	sum	of	these	two	products.	If	both	parents	were	employed,	we	
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calculated	the	mean	of	their	indexes;	if	just	one	of	them	was	employed,	we	used	that	parent’s	index.	
Possible	scores	on	this	index	ranged	from	77	(lowest	SES)	to	11	(highest	SES).	The	majority	of	the	children	
were	from	upper-middle	class	(28.3%)	and	middle	class	(24.2%)	families;	but	some	were	also	distributed	
across	the	other	social	classes	(upper:	14.2%;	lower-middle:	14.2%;	and	lower:	5%).	Table	3	integrates	the	
information	on	SES	with	age	and	offers	more	details	on	family	composition	and	socio-economic	factors.	The	
parents	gave	their	informed	consent	for	their	children	to	participate	in	our	study.	
	
-	Table	2	about	here	-	
	
Material	and	Procedure	
	 We	used	the	same	experimental	protocol	concerning	communicative	failures	administered	in	Bosco	
et	al.	(2006;	2012)	on	a	new	experimental	group	of	children.	In	addition	(with	respect	to	Bosco	et	al,	2006),	
in	the	present	study	we	also	administered	a	set	of	theory	of	mind	tasks. The	protocol	on	communicative	
failure	was	composed	of	videotaped	stories	showing	a	communicative	interaction;	each	video	(in	Italian)	
lasted	approximately	10–15	s	(See	Appendix	A	for	a	full	translation	in	English).	12	stories	involved	a	failure	
(4	involved	failure	of	the	speaker’s	meaning,	4	involved	failure	of	the	expression	act,	4	involved	failure	of	
the	communicative	effect)	and	4	stories	involved	successful	communication	(the	control	tasks).	 
The	experimenter	visited	the	schools	before	the	study	commenced,	in	order	to	familiarize	with	the	
children,	and	subsequently	administered	the	experimental	protocols	to	the	children	individually	in	a	single	
session.	Each	session	lasted	about	40	minutes	and	was	audio-recorded.	The	tasks	concerning	
communicative	failures	were	presented	in	two	different	random	orders,	A	and	B;	each	protocol	contained	
identical	items	but	these	were	administered	in	a	different	sequence	in	each	of	the	two	forms	(A	and	B)	of	
the	protocol,	in	order	to	rule	out	the	possibility	of	the	order	of	presentation	affecting	the	children’s	
performance.	The	participants	in	each	group	were	balanced	for	age	and	gender	and	were	assigned	to	order	
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A	or	B	of	the	protocol	in	a	balanced	way.		
The	experimenter	showed	each	child	the	video-taped	stories,	one	at	a	time,	using	a	portable	
computer;	at	the	end	of	each	story,	he	asked	the	child	the	specific	questions	concerning	the	communicative	
interaction	he	had	just	observed.	Details	about	the	questions	in	the	recognition	and	repair	tasks	are	
provided	in	Appendix	A.		
For	each	recognition	and	repair	task	the	children	obtained	a	score	of	"0"	when	the	answer	was	
considered	incorrect	and	"1"	when	the	answer	was	considered	correct	(see	Appendix	B	for	examples	of	
correct	and	incorrect	answers).	The	inter-rater	agreement	between	judges	was	evaluated	on	30	randomly	
selected	participants	(20%	of	the	total	sample).	Inter-rater	agreement	was	very	high	(Cohen’s	K	=	.88;	p	<	
.001).		
In	addition,	the	following	ToM	tests	were	administered	to	the	children.	These	tests	were	also	
balanced:	they	were	presented	to	half	of	the	participants	before	the	presentation	of	the	communicative	
failure	protocol	and	to	half	of	the	participants	after	the	presentation	of	the	communicative	failure	tasks.	
Moreover,	within	this	balanced	administration	of	the	items,	the	ToM	tasks	were	presented	in	two	different	
orders,	i.e.	first-order	ToM	tasks	followed	by	second-order	ToM	tasks	in	half	of	the	cases	and	vice	versa	in	
the	second	half	of	the	sample.		
We	included	both	first	and	second-order	false	belief	tasks	in	our	experimental	material	because	in	
the	literature	these	are	usually	considered	as	classical	tests	for	evaluating	ToM	ability	(see	Wellman	&	Liu,	
2002).	First	and	second-order	tasks	are	characterized	by	different	levels	of	complexity	and	require	different	
abilities,	that	follow	children’s	cognitive	development	with	age	(see	Perner,	Leekam	&	Wimmer,	1987;	
Perner	&	Winner,	1985).	Considering	the	age	of	our	sample,	we	considered	these	tasks	to	be	appropriate	
for	investigating	the	development	of	ToM	ability	in	the	aforesaid	age	ranges.	
A	detailed	description	of	the	structure	of	each	task	is	provided	in	Table	3.	
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-	Table	3	about	here	–	
	
	Sally	and	Ann	task	(Baron-Cohen,	Leslie	&	Frith,	1985);	the	children	were	asked	to	watch	a	scene	acted	
with	puppets	and	then	answer	a	test	question	(Where	does	Sally	think	the	ball	is?)	and	a	justification	
question	(Why	does	Sally	think	the	ball	is	there?).	A	score	of	1	was	obtained	when	both	the	test	and	the	
justification	were	correct.		
Modified	Smarties	task.	This	is	a	modified	version	of	the	original	Smarties	task	(Perner,	Leekam	&	
Wimmer,	1987).	We	had	to	change	the	object	of	the	task	because	we	realized	that	many	children	do	not	
know	what	Smarties	are	any	more.	In	this	version	of	the	task,	the	experimenter	shows	the	packet	of	a	
famous	brand	of	potato	chips.		
John	and	Mary	and	Maxi	Stories	(Sullivan,	Winner	&	Hopfield,	1995).	These	stories	are	a	modified	
version	of	those	used	in	Perner	&	Wimmer	(1985)	and	Wimmer	&	Perner	(1983),	respectively.	They	have	an	
identical	structure.	Scenarios	of	the	two	stories	are	provided	in	Table	3.	The	test	questions	used	were	the	
“second-order	ignorance	question”	(e.g.	Does	Bobby	know	that	Maxi	knows	where	the	chocolate	is?)	and	
the	“second-order	belief	question”	(e.g.	Where	does	Bobby	go	to	look	for	Maxi?).	According	to	Sullivan’s	
procedure,	during	the	administration	of	the	two	stories,	the	children	were	also	asked	“fact	questions”	(e.g.	
What	did	the	ice-cream	man	tell	Mary?)	and	“first-order	questions”	(e.g.	Does	Mary	know	where	the	ice-
cream	truck	is	now?).	These	questions,	together	with	the	use	of	a	background	and	stand-up	cardboard	
character	props,	were	useful	to	help	the	children	to	follow	the	story	and	to	reduce	the	memory	load	
needed.	However,	these	questions	were	not	taken	into	consideration	in	the	scoring	procedure.	The	
children’s	answers	could	be	scored	1	(correct)	or	0	(incorrect)	for	both	second-order	ignorance	and	belief	
questions.	The	average	value	of	the	scores	obtained	on	those	questions,	for	each	story,	was	then	taken	into	
account.		
Picture	Sequencing	Task	(Langdon	&	Coltheart,	1999).	We	administered	part	of	the	original	task	
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consisting	of	6	stories,	including	2	social	script	and	4	false-belief	sequences.	The	stories	were	depicted	in	
sequences	of	four	black-and-white	cartoon	picture	cards.	The	sequences	were	presented	after	two	practice	
runs,	that	were	not	considered	in	the	scoring	procedure,	but	were	useful	for	the	child	to	familiarize	with	
the	procedure.	The	children	were	asked	to	arrange	the	cards	in	the	correct	order	and	tell	the	story.	
According	to	Langdon’s	instructions,	the	score	range	was	0-6:	a	sequence	scored	2	points	if	the	first	card	
was	in	the	correct	position,	2	points	if	the	last	card	was	in	the	correct	position,	1	point	each	for	the	second	
and	third	cards	being	in	the	correct	position.	Failure	to	produce	a	sequence	scored	0	(see	Table	3).		
	 In	order	to	run	the	analyses	and	evaluate	the	children’s	performance	on	the	different	ToM	tasks,	
we	considered	first-order	and	second-order	ToM	separately.	In	detail,	the	first-order	ToM	value	was	
obtained	by	calculating	the	mean	of	the	scores	on	the	Sally&Ann,	Smarties	and	Picture	Sequencing	task.	
Likewise,	the	second-order	ToM	value	was	obtained	by	considering	the	mean	of	the	scores	obtained	on	the	
Maxi	and	John	&	Mary	tasks.		
	
Results	
The	scores	obtained	by	each	age	group	on	the	communicative	failure	recognition	
and	repair	tasks	are	summarized	in	Table	4	and	those	obtained	on	Theory	of	Mind	tasks		
in	Table	5.	
	
-	Table	4	about	here	-	
-	Table	5	about	here	-	
	
The	distributions	of	the	scores	in	the	age	groups	were	not	normal	according	to	the	Kolmogorov-
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Smirnov	(Recognition	overall:	.001	<	p	<	.023;	Repair	overall:	p	<	.001)	and	Shapiro-Wilk	tests	(Recognition	
overall:	.001	<	p	<	.004;	Repair	overall:	p	<	.001).	We	thus	conducted	an	arcsine	transformation	on	the	
children’s	answers	to	each	ToM	task	and	each	failure	recognition/repair	task	(i.e.	failure	of	expression	act,	
failure	of	the	speaker’s	meaning,	and	failure	of	the	communicative	effect).	We	were	thus	able	to	perform	
parametric	analyses	while	satisfying	the	required	assumptions.		
In	order	to	investigate	the	existence	of	a	correlation	between	performance	on	ToM	tasks	and	
failure	recognition	and	repair	tasks,	we	calculated	partial	correlation	in	the	overall	sample,	controlling	for	
age	and	SES	index,	between	the	ability	to	recognize	and	repair	different	kinds	of	communicative	failures	
and	ToM	abilities,	using	Pearson's	r	correlation	coefficient	(See	Table	6).		
- Table	6	about	here	–	
	
Moreover,	we	calculated	the	correlation	between	failure	and	ToM	tasks	for	each	age	group	(see	
Table	7).		
	
-	Table	7	about	here	-	
	 	
	 Figure	1	shows	the	scores	obtained	by	each	age	group	on	the	recognition	tasks.	To	investigate	the	
children's	performance	in	understanding	successful	communication	acts	and	recognizing	communicative	
failures,	we	conducted	an	ANOVA	with	one	between-subject	factor	(type	of	age	group,	with	four	levels:	
group	A	(3;6-4	years),	group	B	(5-5;6	years),	group	C	(6;6-7	years),	group	D	(8-8;6	years))	and	one	within-
subject	factor	(type	of	communication	task,	with	four	levels:	comprehension	of	successful	acts,	failure	of	
communicative	effect,	failure	of	expression	act	and	failure	of	the	speaker	's	meaning).	In	particular	we	
investigated	whether	recognizing	a	successful	communication	act	is	simpler	than	recognizing	any	kind	of	
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failure	and	whether	children’s	ability	to	recognize	communication	acts	increases	with	age.	This	analysis	
revealed	an	effect	of	the	type	of	communication	task	(F	(3,348)	=	38.52;	p	<	.001;	η2	=	.25).	In	addition,	the	
analysis	revealed	an	effect	of	the	age	group	(F	(1,116)	=	29.59;	p	<	.001;	η2	=	.43).	We	introduced	a	simple	
contrast,	to	compare	the	scores	obtained	on	each	type	of	communication	act,	revealing	that	successful	
communication	acts	are	simpler	than	failure	of	communicative	effect	(F	=	5.65;	p	=	.019),	as	well	as	failure	
of	expression	act	(F	=	33.85;	p	<	.001)	and	of	failure	of	the	speaker’s	meaning	(F	=	64.46;	p	<	.001).	A	post	
hoc	pair-wise	comparison	revealed	a	significant	difference	in	performance	by	the	different	age	groups	(.001	
<	p	<	.04)	with	the	exception	of	groups	C	(6;6-7	years)	vs.	D	(8-8;6	years)	which	achieved	similar	levels	of	
performance	(Bonferroni:	p	=	1).	We	found	an	interaction	between	age	and	type	of	task	(F	(3,348)	=	3.75:	p	<	
.001;	η2	=	.088).	
More	in	detail,	we	performed	separate	ANOVA	analyses	to	investigate	the	effect	of	the	recognition	
of	communicative	failure	task	within	each	age	group	(type	of	recognition	task,	with	three	levels:	failure	of	
communicative	effect,	failure	of	expression	act	and	failure	of	the	speaker	's	meaning).	In	all	the	age	groups,	
an	effect	of	the	type	of	communicative	failure	was	detected:	Group	A	(F	(3,87)	=	9.84;	p	<	.001;	η2	=	.25),	
Group	B	(F	(3,87)	=	9.33;	p	=	.001;	η2	=	.24),	Group	C	(F	(3,87)	=	11.105;	p	<	.001;	η2	=	.28),	Group	D	(F	(3,87)	=	
13.91;	p	<	.001;	η2	=	.32).	We	introduced	linear	contrasts	for	each	analysis,	which	detected	a	linear	trend	in	
scores	depending	on	the	type	of	communicative	failure	in	each	age	group:	Group	A	(F	=	14.81;	p=	.001;	η2	=	
.34),	Group	B	(F	=	16.21;	p	<	.001;	η2	=	.36),	Group	C	(F	=	27.59;	p	<	.001;	η2	=	.49),	Group	D	(F	=	21.08;	p	<	
.001;	η2	=	.42).	According	to	our	hypothesis,	our	data	revealed	the	following	trend,	from	the	simplest	to	the	
most	complex:	recognition	of	failure	of	communicative	effect,	expression	act	and	speaker’s	meaning.	
	
-	Figure	1	about	here	-	
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	 	 Figure	2	shows	the	scores	obtained	by	the	children	in	each	age	group	on	repair	of	
communicative	failure	tasks.		
To	investigate	the	increasing	trend	of	difficulty	exhibited	by	children	in	repairing	failures	of	
expression	act,	speaker's	meaning	and	communicative	effect,	and	whether	their	ability	to	repair	a	
communicative	failure	increases	with	age,	we	conducted	an	ANOVA	with	one	between-subject	factor	(type	
of	age	group,	with	four	levels:	Group	A	(3;6-4	years),	Group	B	(5-5;6	years),	Group	C	(6;6-7	years),	Group	D	
(8-8;6	years)	and	one	within-subject	factor	(type	of	repair	of	failure,	with	three	levels:	repair	of	the	
expression	act,	repair	of	the	speaker's	meaning,	repair	of	the	communicative	effect).	This	analysis	revealed	
a	main	effect	of	the	type	of	repair	of	failure	(F	(2,232)	=	20.24;	p	<	.001;	η2	=	.15).	In	addition,	the	analysis	
revealed	an	effect	of	the	age	group	(F	(1,116)	=	30.9;	p	<	.001;	η2	=.44).	We	introduced	a	linear	contrast,	which	
revealed	a	linear	trend	in	scores	depending	on	the	type	of	repair	task	(F	(1,116)	=	29.16;	p	<	.001;	η2	=	.20).	In	
line	with	our	hypothesis,	there	was	an	increasing	trend	of	difficulty	in	repairing	failures	of	expression	act,	
which	was	the	simplest,	failure	of	speaker’s	meaning	and	failure	of	communicative	effect,	which	was	the	
most	complex.	A	post	hoc	pair-wise	comparison	revealed	that	the	groups	performed	significantly	differently	
(.001	<	p	<	.037)	with	the	exception	of	groups	C	vs.	D	which	only	approached	significance	(p	=	.06).	We	
found	no	interaction	between	the	two	variables	(age	group	and	type	of	task)	(F	(2,232)	=	1.98;	p	=	.07;	η2	=	
.05).	
Also	in	this	case,	we	performed	separate	ANOVA	analyses	to	investigate	the	effect	of	the	
communicative	failure	task	within	each	age	group	(type	of	repair	task,	with	three	levels:	failure	of	
expression	act,	failure	of	the	speaker	's	meaning,	failure	of	the	communicative	effect).	In	all	the	age	groups,	
an	effect	of	the	type	of	communicative	failure	was	detected:	Group	A	(F(2,58)	=	4.67;	p	=	.013;	η2	=	.14),	
Group	B	(F(2,58)	=	7.13;	p	=	.002;	η2	=	.20),	Group	C	(F	(2,58)	=	11.12;	p	<	.001;	η2	=	.28),	Group	D	(F	(2,58)	=	2.99;	p	
=	.05;	η2	=	.09).	We	introduced	linear	contrasts	for	each	analysis,	revealing	a	linear	trend	in	scores	
depending	on	the	type	of	communicative	failure	in	the	age	groups:	Group	B	(F	=	6.62;	p	=	.01;	η2	=	.19),	
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Group	C	(F	=	19.65;	p	<	.001;	η2	=	.40),	Group	D	(F	=	7.96;	p	<	.009;	η2	=	.21);	the	only	exception	is	
represented	by	group	A	(3;6-4	years)	(F	=	2.87;	p	=	.10;	η2	=	.09).	
	
	 	 -	Figure	2	about	here	-	
	 	
We	also	explored	the	influence	of	Socio	Economic	Status	(SES)	on	all	the	abilities	investigated,	
expecting	it	to	have	a	moderate	overall	effect	on	children’s	performance.	We	used	the	Index	of	Social	
Position	(ISP)	as	the	indicator	of	the	children’s	family	SES	(see	Table	8).		
Our	results	showed	that	SES	was	only	partially	related	to	the	ability	to	recognize	and	repair	
communicative	failures.	In	particular,	SES	correlated	only	with	the	ability	to	recognize	a	failure	of	the	
communicative	effect	in	group	A	(3;6-4)	and	B	(5-5;6)	and	with	the	ability	to	recognize	a	failure	of	the	
expression	act	in	group	B	(5-5;6)	and	C	(6;6-7).	As	regards	the	ability	to	repair	communicative	failures,	SES	
only	significantly	correlated	with	the	ability	to	repair	a	failure	of	the	expression	act	in	group	B	(5-5;6)	and	
with	the	ability	to	repair	a	failure	of	the	speaker’s	meaning	in	group	D	(8-8;6).	
	
-	Table	8	about	here	-	
	
Finally,	in	order	to	investigate	whether	age,	SES	or	ToM	were	factors	that	might	be	able	to	explain	
the	increasing	trend	of	difficulty	shown	by	children	in	recognizing	and	repairing	a	communicative	failure,	
we	conducted	a	series	of	regression	analysis,	using	as	dependent	variable	the	children’s	performance	on	
each	type	of	failure	tasks	and	using	as	predictors	the	age,	the	SES	and	ToM	performance	(see	Table	9).	In	
particular,	we	created	a	hierarchical	model	of	multiple	regression	analysis,	including	as	predictor	variables	
age	–	Step	1	–	SES	–	Step	2	–	I	order	ToM	ability	-	Step	3	–	and	II	order	ToM	ability	–	Step	4.	Table	9	displays	
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the	adjusted	regression	coefficients	(R2Adj)	for	each	predictor	variable,	the	change	in	R2		after	the	addition	of	
SES	and	first		and	second	order	ToM	(R2Change),	the	change	in	F		(F	Change)	and	its	significance	value	(Sig	F	
Change).	
The	regression	analysis	revealed	that	age	(Step	1)	was	able	to	explain	the	results	obtained	by	the	
children	on	the	failure	tasks,	both	for	recognition	and	repair.	We	then,	introduced	Step	2	with	another	
predictor,	i.e.	SES	index.	The	analysis	showed	that,	in	the	majority	of	cases,	with	the	exception	of	the	most	
difficult	tasks,	i.e.	recognition	of	speaker’s	meaning	and	repair	of	communicative	effect,	SES	significantly	
improved	the	prediction.		
Similarly,	the	third	Step	we	tested	(adding	children’s	performance	on	first-order	ToM	tasks	as	a	
regressor)	was	able	to	significantly	improve	the	prediction	for	recognition	of	the	communicative	effect	and	
recognition	of	the	expressive	act,	but	not	for	the	most	difficult	task	to	solve,	i.e.	recognition	of	the	
speaker’s	meaning;	as	for	repair,	Step	3	was	able	to	improve	the	prediction	for	the	Repair	of	the	expressive	
act	and	repair	of	the	communicative	effect,	but	not	for	the	repair	of	the	speaker’s	meaning.	Finally,	we	
introduced	Step	4	(second-order	ToM	tasks),	which	was	not	able	to	improve	the	prediction	for	any	of	the	
failure	tasks,	considering	both	recognition	and	repair	tasks.		
In	particular,	the	analysis	revealed	that	within	both	the	model	comprehending	first-order	ToM	
(Step	3)	and	the	model	comprehending	second-order	ToM	(Step	4),	the	R2	did	not	increase	in	line	with	the	
trend	of	increasing	difficulty	exhibited	by	children	in	solving	the	tasks,	both	in	recognizing	and	in	repairing	a	
communicative	failure.	The	R2	value	indicates	how	much	variance	is	explained	by	a	certain	variable.	If	ToM	
(both	first	and	second-order)	were	the	factor	that	best	explained	the	difference	in	difficulty	between	the	
tasks,	then	we	would	expect	the	R2	value	to	follow	the	trend	of	difficulty	in	the	recognition	and	repair	of	
communicative	failures	whereas,	by	contrast,	the	increase	in	the	R2	value	did	not	follow	the	expected	
trend.	A	similar	explanation	also	holds	for	age	(Step	1)	and	SES	(Step	2):	the	R2	did	not	increase	in	line	with	
the	trend	of	increasing	difficulty	exhibited	by	children	in	solving	the	tasks,	both	in	recognizing	and	in	
repairing	a	communicative	failure.			
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- Table	9	about	here	-	
	 	
Conclusions	
This	study	empirically	investigated	the	role	that	ToM,	age	and	SES	play	in	the	ability	to	recognize	
and	repair	a	communicative	failure.	We	predicted	that	ToM	would	be	correlated	with	children's	ability	to	
recognize	and	repair	communicative	failures.	We	also	proposed	that	the	increasing	complexity	of	the	
mental	representations,	i.e.	the	existence	and	the	number	of	discrepancies	and	inconsistencies	involved	in	
a	communicative	failure,	explains	the	increasing	difficulty	that	children	had	in	recognizing	and	repairing	the	
different	sorts	of	communicative	failures	we	investigated,	i.e.,	failure	of	the	expression	act,	failure	of	the	
speaker’s	meaning	and	failure	of	the	communicative	effect.	Finally	we	investigated	whether	ToM,	age	or	
SES	were	alternative	factors,	with	respect	to	the	complexity	of	the	mental	representations	involved,	able	to	
explain	the	increasing	trend	of	difficulty	we	detected.	
	 First	of	all,	we	replicated	the	overall	results	of	Bosco	and	colleagues	(2006),	confirming	that	a	
successful	act,	involving	neither	discrepancies	nor	inconsistencies,	is	always	easier	to	understand	than	each	
kind	of	failure	recognition	task.	Focusing	on	the	ability	to	both	recognize	and	repair	communicative	failures,	
we	found	that,	in	line	with	our	expectations,	there	was	an	effect	of	age	on	the	children’s	performance	and	
that	their	scores	improved	with	age.	However,	we	only	detected	an	improvement	in	performance	on	all	
tasks	up	to	6;6	years	of	age.	For	what	concerns	the	recognition	of	failure	of	communicative	effect,	the	
easiest	recognition	task	to	solve,	we	detect	a	”ceiling	effect”	in	the	older	group	of	8-years-old.	For	what	
concerns	the	others	tasks	a	possible	explanation	for	such	lack	of	improvement	is	that	during	this	
developmental	period	the	gap	between	the	two	age	groups	is	too	small	and	it	is	possible	that	testing	older	
children,	for	example	aged	9-10	years,	could	reveal	an	improvement	in	performance.		
	 Focusing	on	each	age	group,	separate	analyses	confirmed	our	prediction	concerning	the	existence	
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of	an	increasing	trend	of	difficulty	in	the	recognition	of	a	communicative	failure;	children	in	all	the	age	
groups	found	it	easier	to	recognize:	failure	of	communicative	effect,	followed	by	failure	of	expression	act	
and	then	failure	of	speaker's	meaning.	
	 Similarly,	focusing	separately	on	the	performance	of	the	different	age	groups	in	terms	of	their	
ability	to	repair	the	failure	of	a	communication	act,	we	observed,	in	line	with	our	prediction,	that	children	
found	it	easier	to	repair	the	failure	of	the	expression	act	than	the	failure	of	the	speaker's	meaning,	followed	
by	the	repair	of	the	communicative	effect.	This	applied	for	all	the	age	groups,	with	the	only	exception	of	
the	youngest	group	of	children	aged	3;6-4	years.	In	this	case	their	performance	approached	a	“floor	effect”.	
One	possible	explanation	is	that	repairing	a	communicative	failure	is	too	difficult	for	children	aged	3;6-4	
years.	
	 Focusing	on	the	relation	between	ToM	and	the	ability	to	recognize	and	repair	each	kind	of	failure	
and	in	order	to	have	a	“pure”	measure,	we	conducted	a	correlation	analysis	controlling	for	the	role	of	age	
and	SES	index.	This	showed	that,	considered	overall,	ToM	tasks	correlated	with	recognition	of	
communicative	effect	and	expression	act,	but	not	with	the	recognition	of	the	speaker’s	meaning,	the	most	
difficult	task	for	children	to	recognize.	Similarly	regarding	repair	abilities,	ToM	performance	correlated	with	
the	repair	of	expression	act	and	of	the	speaker’s	meaning	but	not	with	the	repair	of	the	communicative	
effect,	again	the	most	difficult	task	for	children	to	solve.	These	data	suggest	that	ToM	could	have	only	a	
partial	role	in	explaining	the	increasing	trend	of	difficulty	we	detected	in	recognizing	and	repairing	a	
communicative	failure,	since	it	does	not	correlate	with	the	tasks	that	the	children	found	most	difficult	to	
recognize	and	repair.	We	have	also	performed,	considering	the	overall	sample,	a	correlation	analysis	
considering	the	role	of	first	and	second-order	ToM	separately,	and	found	first-order	ToM	to	correlate	with	
a	larger	number	of	communicative	failure	tasks.,	i.e.	with	recognition	of	failure	of	communicative	effect,	
failure	of	expression	act,	repair	of	failure	of	expression	act	and	repair	of	failure	of	communicative	effect,	
than	second-order	ToM,	which	only	correlates	with	the	recognition	of	failure	of	the	communicative	effect	
and	failure	of	the	expression	act.	
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	 In	order	to	study	the	issue	in	more	depth,	we	also	investigated	the	correlation	between	these	
variables	i.e.	I	and	II	order	ToM	and	the	ability	to	recognize	and	repair	each	kind	of	failure,	in	each	age	
group.	Our	data	revealed	that	the	correlations	were	only	statistically	significant	in	some	cases.	In	particular	
we	found	that	I	order	ToM	correlated	with	the	performance	of	the	youngest	group	of	children	(3-year-olds)	
on	all	the	recognition	and	repair	tasks,	with	the	only	exception	of	the	recognition	of	failure	of	the	speaker’s	
meaning.	By	contrast,	in	the	other	age	groups	the	only	significant	results	concerned	the	correlation	
between	I	order	ToM	tasks	and	repair	of	failure	of	the	expression	act	in	the	groups	of	5-	and	6-years-olds	
children.	For	what	concenrs	II	order	ToM	tasks	ore	results	reveal	a	significant	correlation	with	recognition	
of	communicative	effects	and	recognition	of	expression	act	in	the	youngest	3-years.odls	children.	For	what	
concenr	the	other	age	groups	significant	correlation	were	only	revealed	between	II	order	ToM	and	repair	of	
the	communicative	effct	in	the	group	of	years-old	children	and	with	the	repair	of	the	speaker’s	meanning	in	
8-years-olds	children.	Taken	as	a	whole,	these	data	suggest	that	I	order	ToM	plays	a	role	in	explaining	the	
development	of	children’s	ability	to	recognize	and	repair	a	communicative	failure	mainly	in	the	3;6-4	years	
age	group,	that	is	the	developmental	period	in	which	children	usually	start	to	pass	the	false	belief	task,	
which	constituted	our	principal	task	for	measuring	I	order	ToM	ability.	Furthermore,	no	part	of	such	pattern	
of	correlations	is	in	line	with	the	predicted	trend	of	difficulty	we	detected.	For	example,	first-order	ToM	
does	not	systematically	correlate	with	the	easiest	task	to	solve	and	second-order	ToM	does	not	
systematically	correlate	with	more	difficult	ones.	
For	explorative	purposes,	we	also	investigated	the	possible	relationship	between	children’s	ability	
to	recognize	and	repair	communicative	failures	and	their	socio-economic	background	(SES	index)	for	each	
age	group.	The	analysis	revealed	no	significant	correlation	with	the	exception	of	a	few	cases	testifying	that	
recognition	and	repair	of	a	communicative	failure	are	only	partially	affected	by	the	SES	indicator.		
Finally,	we	performed	a	regression	analysis	in	order	to	acquire	a	deeper	understanding	of	whether	
the	trends	of	difficulty	in	recognizing	and	repairing	the	different	kinds	of	communicative	failures	we	
detected,	could	better	be	attributed	to	the	children’s	ToM	abilities,	age	or	SES	rather	than	-	as	we	proposed	
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-	to	the	complexity	of	the	mental	representations	involved.	In	particular,	we	created	a	hierarchical	model	of	
multiple	regression	analysis,	including	as	predictor	variables	age	–	Step	1	–	SES	–	Step	2,		I	order	theory	of	
mind	abilities	-	Step	3-		and	II	order	ToM	abilities	-	Step	4.	The	results	revealed	that	age	explains	the	trend	
of	the	results	and	SES	also	seems	to	be	able	to	imply	a	significant	increase	in	the	variance	of	performance	
on	simple	tasks,	regarding	both	recognition	and	repair	abilities;	indeed,	no	significant	changes	connected	to	
the	SES	emerged	in	recognition	of	the	speaker’s	meaning	and	in	the	repair	of	the	communicative	effect.		
Moreover,	the	insertion	of	Step	3,	including	first-order	ToM,	determined	a	significant	increase	in	
the	variance	of	performance	on	failure	tasks,	though	not	in	all	cases.	In	particular,	considering	ability	on	
recognition	tasks,	first-order	ToM	was	found	to	have	a	role	in	explaining	the	variance	in	children’s	
performance	on	recognition	of	the	communicative	effect	and	recognition	of	the	expressive	act,	but	not	for	
the	most	difficult	task	to	solve,	i.e.	recognition	of	the	speaker’s	meaning;	as	for	Repair,	Step	3	including	
first-order	ToM	as	a	regressor,	determined	a	significant	increase	in	the	variance	of	performance	in	repairing	
the	expressive	act	and	the	communicative	effect	but	not	in	repairing	the	speaker’s	meaning.	
Finally,	the	introduction	of	Step	4	(including	second-order	ToM	performance	as	a	regressor),	did	not	
determine	any	increase	in	the	variance	of	performance	on	failure	tasks,	considering	both	recognition	and	
repair.	
	 More	in	detail,	we	analyzed	the	trend	of	R2	referring	to	each	particular	failure	task.	If	ToM	were	the	
principal	factor	in	explaining	the	children’s	increasing	difficulty	in	recognizing	the	different	tasks	we	
analyzed,	when	introducing	Step	3	and	4	(I	and	II	order	ToM),	we	would	expect	to	see	an	increase	in	the	R2	
value	indicating	how	much	variance	is	explained	by	a	certain	variable,	in	line	with	the	observed	trend.	By	
contrast,	we	observed	that	when	introducing	Step	3	and	Step	4	(I	and	II	order	ToM,	respectively)	the	R2	
value	did	not	increase	in	line	with	the	trend	of	increasing	difficulty	experienced	by	the	children	in	
recognizing	communicative	failures.	In	detail,	both	in	Step	3	and	Step	4,	the	higher	R2	value	corresponds	to	
the	relationship	between	ToM	and	recognition	of	the	failure	of	the	communicative	effect,	which	is	the	
simplest	kind	of	task	to	solve,	whereas	the	lower	R2	value	corresponds	to	the	relationship	between	ToM	
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and	recognition	of	the	failure	of	the	expression	act,	which	is	not	the	most	difficult	type	of	failure	to	
recognize.	A	similar	explanation	also	holds	for	age	(Step	1)	and	SES	(Step	2):	the	R2	did	not	increase	in	line	
with	the	trend	of	increasing	difficulty	exhibited	by	children	in	recognizing	a	communicative	failure.		
	 We	found	a	similar	pattern	of	results	for	the	repair	of	a	communicative	failure.	If	ToM	were	the	
main	factor	in	explaining	the	children’s	increasing	difficulty	in	repairing	the	different	tasks	we	analyzed,	
when	introducing	Step	3	and	Step	4	(I	and	II	order	ToM,	respectively),	we	would	expect	to	see	an	increase	
in	the	R2	value,	in	line	with	the	observed	trend.	By	contrast,	the	higher	R2	value	corresponds	to	the	
relationship	between	both	I	and	II	order	ToM	and	the	repair	of	the	failure	of	the	speaker’s	meaning,	which	
is	not	the	most	difficult	kind	of	repair	task	whereas	the	lower	R2	value	corresponds	to	the	relation	between	
both	I	and	II	order	ToM	and	the	repair	of	the	failure	of	the	communicative	effect,	which	is	the	most	difficult	
repair	task.	Again,	a	similar	explanation	also	holds	for	age	(Step	1)	and	SES	(Step	2):	the	R2	did	not	increase	
in	line	with	the	trend	of	increasing	difficulty	exhibited	by	children	in	repairing	a	communicative	failure.	
Considered	as	a	whole,	these	results	suggest	that	age,	ToM	(I	and	II	order)	and	SES	seem	not	to	be	the	best	
predictors	of	the	trend	of	difficulty	in	recognizing	and	repairing	a	communicative	failure	that	we	observed.		
The	results	of	the	present	study	are	in	line	with	those	reported	previously	in	the	literature	showing	
that	children’s	ability	to	manage	communicative	failures	increases	with	age	(e.g.	Garvey,	1984;	Marcos,	
1991).	The	results	of	the	present	study	are	also	partially	in	line	with	previous	research	(Bosco	et	al.,	2012)	
using	the	same	experimental	protocol	concerning	communicative	failures	that	we	administered	in	this	
study,	which	showed	that	in	patients	with	schizophrenia	there	is	a	correlation	between	(a	deficit	in)	ToM,	
i.e.	False	Belief	(Baron-Cohen,	Leslie	&	Frith,	1985)	and	Strange	Stories	tasks	(Happè,	Brownell,	&	Winner,	
1999),	and	the	(difficulty	in)	recognition	and	repair	of	a	communicative	failure.	However,	in	the	aforesaid	
study	by	Bosco	et	al.	(2012),	ToM	was	not	able	to	explain	the	increasing	trend	of	difficulty	in	recognizing	
and	repairing	a	communicative	failure	experienced	by	the	patients.	The	convergence	of	the	results	of	these	
two	studies	supports	the	validity	of	our	theoretical	model,	both	for	the	development	and	for	the	
impairment	of	the	ability	to	handle	a	communicative	failure.	A	possible	suspect	is	that	our	results	contrast	
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with	the	study	of	Bernard	&	Deleau	(2007)	showing	that	in	children	of	3	and	4	years	of	age	conversational	
perspective	taking	ability	predices	the	performance	to	false	belief	attribution	tasks.	However	the	main	
difference	between	our	research	and	the	mentioned	one	consists	in	the	object	of	the	study	and,	as	a	
consequence,	in	the	different	experimental	material	used	to	empirically	investigate	it.	The	experimental	
task	used	by	Bernard	and	Deleau	requires	the	child	to	understand	who,	among	several	possible	speakers	in	
a	picture	story,	is	proffering	a	specific	utterance.	By	contrast,	our	experimental	tasks	require	the	child	to	
understand	(or	produce)	the	(pragmatic)	communicative	meaning	of	a	communicative	act	(for	example	the	
child	sees	a	person	spoiling	something	and	another	person	commenting	"Well	done",	and	has	to	
understand	that	the	communicative	intent	of	the	utterance	is	to	be	ironic/to	see	something	funny).	The	
experiment	of	Bernard	and	Deleau	investigates	something	different,	i.e.	(conversational)	perspective	taking	
with	respect	to	our	study,	i.e.	communicative	pragmatic	ability,	and	thus	the	results	of	the	two	studies	are	
not	directly	comparable.	Furthermore	Bernard	&	Deleau	(2007)	concluded	their	study	(page	456)	as	
follows:"Considering	perspective-taking	at	the	intra-individual	level	opens	the	question	of	the	underlying	
process(es)	and	its	(their)	ecological	validity.	Although	the	construction	of	the	tasks	as	well	as	the	data	
analyses	were	conducted	under	an	assumption	of	unicity	(i.e.	conversational	perspective-taking	as	a	unique	
construct),	this	assumption	has	to	be	discussed	in	future	both	in	theoretical	terms	(does	conversational	
perspective-taking	refer	to	one	major	ability	or	are	there	different	groups	of	pragmatic	or	discursive	abilities	
contributing	to	conversational	perspective-taking?)	and	through	empirical	work	using	more	refined	models	
to	analyze	data	collected	from	a	diversity	of	judgment	tasks	in	larger	groups	of	participants."	
As	a	final	point,	again	in	their	conclusion,	Bernard	and	Deleau	(2007)	state	(page	455)	that	"in	
accordance	with	our	hypothesis	conversational	perspective	taking	scores	at	a	given	age	contribute	
independently	to	the	variability	of	false	belief	attribution	scores	at	later	age"	(page	455).	
We	do	not	think	this	conclusion	is	in	contrast	with	our	results.	Moreover,	several	theoretical	
(Tirassa,	Bosco	&	Colle,	2006a;	2006b)	and	empirical	(Wellman	and	Liu,	2002)	studies	in	the	literature	are	in	
line	with	Bernard	and	Deleau	(2007)	showing	that	in	a	developmental	domain,	perspective	taking	ability	
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precedes	the	ability	to	solve	false	belief	tasks.		
The	limit	of	the	present	investigation	is	that	it	focuses	too	much	on	a	specific	measure	of	ToM,	i.e.	
the	False	Belief	task.	Future	research	could	consider	other	aspects	of	ToM,	such	as	for	example	
comprehension	of	intention,	and	also	investigate	younger	children	in	order	to	examine	the	simplest	ToM	
components,	such	as	perspective	taking.	Moreover,	in	further	studies	it	might	be	interesting	to	include 
measures of language ability in children, in order to control for this factor as well.	
To	summarize,	notwithstanding	its	limitations,	the	novelty	of	the	present	study	lies	in	the	fact	that	
it	empirically	investigates	the	role	of	ToM	in	children’s	ability	to	recognize	and	repair	a	communicative	
failure,	showing	that	children's	ToM	plays	a	partial	role	in	such	ability.	In	particular,	considering	the	overall	
sample	of	children,	when	controlling	for	age	and	SES,	ToM	correlated	with	the	ability	to	recognize	the	
failure	of	communicative	effect	and	expression	act,	but	not	with	the	ability	to	recognize	the	speaker’s	
meaning,	the	most	difficult	task	for	children.	Similarly,	ToM	correlated	with	the	ability	to	repair	failures	of	
the	expression	act	and	failures	of	the	speaker’s	meaning	but	not	with	the	ability	to	repair	failures	of	the	
communicative	effect,	again	the	most	difficult	task	for	children.	In	addition,	analyses	performed	on	each	
age	group	separately	showed	that	ToM	only	has	a	significant	role	in	explaining	the	ability	to	recognize	and	
repair	different	kinds	of	communicative	failures	in	the	youngest	group	of	children,	aged	3;6-4	years.	
Furthermore,	we	found	no	empirical	evidence	to	suggest	that	ToM,	SES	or	age	are	the	factors	that	best	
explain	the	trend	of	increasing	difficulty	shown	by	children	in	recognizing	and	repairing	the	different	
communicative	failures	investigated.	By	contrast,	the	increasing	complexity	of	the	mental	representations	
involved	provides	a	more	convincing	theoretical	explanation	for	their	different	performance	on	the	various	
failure	tasks	investigated	(see	also	Bosco	et	al.	2006).	This	explanation	is	in	line	with	previous	studies	
investigating	pragmatic	ability	in	children	(Bara	&	Bucciarelli,	1999;	Bosco,	Bucciarelli	&	Bara	2004;	Bosco	&	
Bucciarelli,	2008;	Bosco,	Vallana	&	Bucciarelli,	2012;	Bosco	et	al.,	2013)	showing	that	the	complexity	of	the	
mental	representations	necessary	to	solve	a	communicative	pragmatic	task	is	an	important	cognitive	factor	
in	accounting	for	children’s	communicative	performance.	
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Appendix	A	
Experimental	protocol	
	
Here	we	provide	an	example	of	each	kind	of	failure	investigated,	an	example	of	a	control	task	and	the	
questions	that	the	experimenter	posed	to	the	subjects.	
	
Communicative	failures	
FAILURE	OF	THE	EXPRESSION	ACT:	
(1)	Anna	is	close	to	Barbara	and	says:	
Anna:	‘I’m	so	hungry.	.	.’	
Anna	turns	round	and	washes	her	hands.	While	Anna	is	washing	her	hands,	Barbara	opens	a	cupboard,	
takes	out	a	sandwich,	and	offers	it	to	her	friend,	saying	
Barbara:	‘Anna,	do	you	want	a	sandwich?’	
Anna	has	her	back	turned	to	Barbara,	the	water	is	making	a	lot	of	noise,	and	Anna	has	not	heard	what	
Barbara	said.	Anna	finishes	washing	her	hands	and	as	she	turns	off	the	faucet,	she	says:	
Anna:	‘Did	you	say	something?’	
	
FAILURE	OF	THE	SPEAKER’S	MEANING:		
(2)	There	are	a	lot	of	books	on	the	floor	along	with	an	empty	bookcase.	Luciano	is	putting	the	books	in	the	
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bookcase	and	says:	
Luciano:	‘Mario	is	coming,	I’ll	ask	him	to	help	me	put	the	books	in	the	bookcase’.	
Mario	comes	in.	
Luciano:	‘Hi	Mario,	are	you	busy	at	the	moment?’	
Mario:	‘No,	I’m	free,	we	could	go	have	an	ice-cream!’	
FAILURE	OF	THE	COMMUNICATIVE	EFFECT:		
(3)	Mother	and	daughter.	
Daughter:	‘Mum,	please,	will	you	buy	me	a	doll’	
Mother:	‘No,	you	have	lots	of	dolls’	
Daughter:	‘Mum	I	promise	this	will	be	the	last	time	I	ask	you	for	one’.	
Mother:	‘I	said	no,	there’s	no	point	in	asking	me	again!’.	
	
QUESTIONS	
At	the	end	of	each	video-taped	interaction	the	experimenter	asks	the	child:	
C1:	In	your	opinion,	has	[name	of	partner]	understood/done4	what	[name	of	speaker]	asked	(for/to	do)	or	
not?	
............................................................................................................	
																																								 																				
4	In Failure of the expressive act and Failure of the speaker’s meaning, the children were asked if the partner has understood what the speaker said. In 
Failure of the communicative effect, such a question is inappropriate because the crucial point is not the partner’s denial, and not his understanding of 
the speaker’s question. Therefore, the children were asked if the partner has done what the speaker wanted.	
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If	the	child	recognizes	the	failure,	the	experimenter	asks:	
RI:	'What	might	[name	of	speaker]	say	or	do	now	to	obtain	what	she/he	wants?'	
............................................................................................................	
If	the	subject	DOES	NOT	RECOGNIZE	the	communicative	failure	the	experimenter	asks:	
R2:	'What	might	[name	of	speaker]	say	or	do	now?'	
......................................……………………………………………..	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Successful	communication	
CONTROL	TASKS	
(4)	Elisa	and	Giovanni	are	in	a	room	and	the	window	is	open:	
Elisa:	‘It’s	very	cold	in	here,	please	do	something	about	it!’	
Giovanni:	‘Yes	Elisa,	I’ll	close	the	window’	
Giovanni	closes	the	window.	
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CONTROL	QUESTIONS:	
C1:	In	your	opinion,	has	[name	of	partner]	understood	what	[name	of	speaker]	asked	(for)	or	not?	
......................................……………………………………………..	
If	the	subject	answers	yes,	the	experimenter	asks	
RI:	'What	might	[name	of	speaker]	say	or	do	now?'	
......................................……………………………………………..	
If	the	subject	answers	no,	the	experimenter	asks:	
R2:	'Why	didn‘t	[name	of	partner]	understand	what	[name	of	speaker]	asked	(for)?	
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Appendix B  
Examples of correct and incorrect answers 
 
Recognition 
Answer to question C1 for all failure tasks: 
Correct answer: No 
Incorrect answer: Yes 
 
Repair 
Answer to question R1 and R2. 
 
FAILURE OF THE EXPRESSION ACT (1): 
Examples of correct answers: "She can say it again", "She could repeat it louder" 
Examples of incorrect answers: "She can offer something else, maybe a glass of water", "I don't know", "Say 
please". 
 
FAILURE OF THE SPEAKER’S MEANING (2):  
Examples of correct answers:" He should say he needs help", "He can say 'Maybe later but now, please, help 
me’". 
Examples of incorrect answers: "He should go closer", "I don't know" 
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FAILURE OF THE COMMUNICATIVE EFFECT (3):  
Examples of correct answers: "She can promise her mum that she will help her with some chores in return", 
Examples of incorrect answers: "She can repeat what she said", "She can say please", "I don't know". 
 
CONTROL TASKS 
Examples of correct answers: "Yes, He was kind and he closed the window". 
Examples of incorrect answers: "No, he didn't understand" 
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Table 1 
Recognition	 Discrepancy	 Inconsistencies	 Representational		
complexity	
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communicative	act	
	
No	
	
No	
	
-	
Failure	of		
Communicative	Effect	
	
Yes	
	
No	
	
+	
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Yes	 Yes	(move)	
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Speaker’s	Meaning	
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